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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

ALVIN C. SPACKMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

Case No. 6844

! r ALTON J. CARSON,
Defendant and Appellant
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.................... _______
_.

OI.'RIC, SUPREME COURT, UTAH

GEORGE C. HEINRICH,
L. E. NELSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALVIN C. SPACKMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
ALTON J. CARSON,
Defendant and Appellant

1

Case No. 6844

j

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is 25 years of age and a resident of
Richmond, Utah. On 25th day of October, 1947, he was
the owner of a Harley Davidson Motorcycle, and was an
experienced motorcycle operator. (Tr. 83, 84.) About
3:45 o'clock p. m. of said day, plaintiff was returning on
his motorcycle from Logan City to his home in Richmond
along U. S. Highway 91, which is an inter-state and
National highway; The defendant's home is situated on
the east side of said highway and about 1.2 miles south
of Richmond. The highway at that point is straight and
level, and runs about twenty degrees east of north. The
weather was clear, and pavement dry. (Tr. 146.) The
concrete pavement is 18 feet wide with a yellow center
line, and with a six foot dirt shoulder on each side of
the pavement. (Tr. 86, 87.) Defendant's 1~ ton truck
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was parked about four feet east of the pavement on said
highway in front of his home, facing north Tr. 88, 89, 90)
and directly behind defendant's parked automobile.
(Tr. 215.)
The plaintiff was traveling about 45 miles per hour
and about in the middle of the east lane, ( Tr. 145) and
he first observed the truck when about 200 feet south
of the same at which time the truck was motionless; (Tr.
146) and as plaintiff approac~ed nearer and when about
thirty feet south of place of collision, the defendant, without giving a signal ( Tr. 96) drove his truck suddenly and
directly onto the highway and immediately in front of the
plaintiff. ( Tr. 89, 162.) The truck was traveling about ten
miles per hour and was entering the pavement on an
angle of about 45 degrees with the highway. (Tr. 163,
157.)
As soon as plaintiff saw the truck moving onto the
pavement in front of him he immediately applied his
brakes, ( Tr. 166) and turned his motorcycle to the left,
endeavoring to avoid a collision, and at the time of impact the front end of the truck had reached a point about
on the center line of the highway, (Tr. 162, 170) and
the motorcvcle collided with the truck at the rear end
of the left front fender and in front of left door of the
cab. ( Tr. 95, 96.) The plaintiff and the motorcycle both ·
hurdled over the hood or front end of the truck; the motorcycle landing in the west lane and the plaintiff on the
west shoulder of the highway, and about 15 or 20 feet
northwest from point of impact. (Tr. 96, 97, 113, 167.)
The defendant's truck immediately turned off into the
-

ol
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east barrow pit and stopped about 6 or 8 feet north,
fron1 \Vhere plaintiff '\Vas lying on shoulder, and across
the highway to the east side. (Tr. 97, 98.)
There is very little, if any real dispute between the
plaintiff and defendant on the foregoing facts. While
the defendant testified that he gave a signal before he
started his tn1ck for\vard, vet he also testified that he
didn't look for traffic before he started, ( Tr. 248) and
that he drove his tn1ck upon the pavement without stopping or looking for traffic coming from the south. (Tr.
248.) He testified that he looked straight ahead, (Tr.
248) and he admitted that he did not see respondent or
the motorcycle until after the collision. ( Tr. 169, 251.)
The foregoing testimony clearly proves that the defendant-absentmindedly drove his truck forward without giving a signal, or, without stopping before entering upon
the pavement and without looking south to be sure that
he could safely enter upon, or cross the highway. The
fact that he didn't see the plaintiff before the collision
clearly indicates that defendant did not look for traffic.
.I

The plaintiff ~estified that the collision occurred
about on the center line of the highway. (Tr. 96.) The
defendant practically agrees with the plaintiff on this
fact, since defendant stated that the left front wheel of
the truck was about 2 feet east of center line at time of
collision. (Tr. 217.) And defendant admits that the
plaintiff and the motorcycle hurdled over the front end
of truck and the defendant landed on west shoulder of
the highway and the motorcycle stopped in . the west
lane. (Tr. 220.) The defendant could easily have been
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mistaken as to the exact location of the collision, as he
was sitting up in the cab, while the plaintiff was sitting
on the motorcycle and nearer the pavement, and the
plaintiff was aware of the impending accident and the
defendant was not, ( Tr. 169) because he did not see the
motorcycle until after it collided with the truck. ( Tr. 218.)
ARGUMENT
The only error appellant urges as a ground for reversal is that "the trial court erred in denying appellant's
motion for a directed verdict in favor of appellant" and
in support thereof on page 6 of his brief predicates two
propositions: ( 1) There is no evidence appellant was negligent, and ( 2) that the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of the respondent in failing to keep
a lookout for appellant's truck, and to act properly in
accord with the knowledge this would have brought him.
Under the facts, and the law applicable thereto, the
effect of appellant's argument is an attempt on his part
to entirely ignore the provisions of Section 57-7-132, and
the puropse thereof.
Section 57-7-132, provides:
"No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped,
standing, or parked unless and until such movement
can be made with reasonable saftey."
The rule involved in the foregoing statute was covered by the Court's instructions Nos. 13 and 15, (Tr.

56, 58.)
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This statute has not been construed by this Court,
but a companion statute, (Section 57-7-139) and one of
similar import, was recently constn1ed by this Court in the
case of Nielson v. ~lauchley, 202 P. 2d. 547, wherein the
rule governing the duty of a motorist, about to enter a
highway is laid down in the following language:
"The true n1le is that, under the section of the
Vehicle Code above quoted, it is made the duty of
the driver of an automobile entering the highway
from a private drive to look for approaching cars,
and not to proceed if one is coming, unless, as a
reasonably prudent and cautious person he believes,
and has a right to believe, that he can pass in front
of the other in safety.,, (Italics added.)
These statutes both require that the motorist entering a through highway, either fron1 a standing position,
or from a private road or driveway, shall look for and
yield the right-of-way to all approaching vehicles on said
highway.
Appellant at pages 3 and 5 of his brief attempts to
make much of the fact that he moved the truck backward, then forward, etc., at a slow rate of speed before
entering upon the highway and that the plaintiff should
have seen him but did not - and that this testimony is
uncontradicted. This statement is a strained and unreasonable interpretation of the testimony and unjustified.
Nor is it accurate. It was contradicted. For example, respondent testified, (Tr. 162): "I seen - I was only just a
short distance when the truck 1noved out immediately and
into the highway.
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Q. Onto the highway? A. Yes.
Q. And was that the time when you say you were
about thirty feet south of it? A.

Yes."

And there are at least two sufficient answers to appellant's contention: ( 1) The jury by their verdict decided not to believe this testimony. For instance, they
could easily believe that if defendant made the maneuvers he claims to have made, respondent would have
passed him before he entered the highway, and there
would have been no accident, and ( 2) even if defendant
did so move his truck, this fact, under the statutes above
cited and the rule laid down by this Court in Nielsen v.
Mauchley, supra) was not a warning to respondent, acting
reasonably, that appellant would continue and enter upon
the highway until he could do so in safety.

I.

Defendants negligence was a proximate cause of
accident.

It is respectfully submitted by respondent that the
preponderance if not the greater weight of the evidence,
clearly shows that the proximate cause of the accident in
this case resulted from the defendant's violation of the
provisions of Section 57-7-132, as well as the foregoing
rule laid down b:ythis Court in Nielsen v. Mauchley.
supra. It is further submitted that the preponderance
of the evidence in the case at bar, supports the conclusion
that the appellant, without thinking and without warning,
suddenly and abruptly drove his truck upon the highway,
directly in front of and in the path of the respondent's
motorcycle, and completely· barricaded the east lane of
the high,vay, and so close in front of him that the re-
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spondent, within the space, and the time available could
not by the exercise of reasonable care have possibly
avoided colliding 'vith the appellant's truck.
The appelllant in his attempt to show that plaintiff
\\ras guilty of negligence, and that it was a proximate cause
of the accident has cited the case of Conklin v. Walsh,
193 Pac. 2d. 437 (Utah.) The appellant attempts to
compare the position of the defendant Walsh in that case
with that of the plaintiff in the instant case, because as
he says in his brief on page 9 "While 200 feet back, he, Walsh, observed avehicle approaching on his left and then failed to observe the approaching vehicle again until it was too
late to avoid the collision.''
There is no evidence in the instant case that the
defendant's truck was moving toward or upon the highway when the plaintiff was 200 feet south of the defendant's truck. On the contrary, the evidence shows without dispute that when the plaintiff was 200 feet south
of the defendant's truck, it was then standing motionless
on the shoulder of the highway, facing north; and although the plaintiff was looking straight ahead, as he
approached nearer the truck, he did not see it move toward the highway until he was about SO feet south of
the place of collision, at which time the defendant's tn1ck
1noved onto the highWay in front of the plaintiff, who
was then so near the truck that all he could humanly do
was apply his brakes and turn to the left endeavoring to
avoid a collision. It will thus be seen that there is not
the remotest resemblence between the facts in the Conklin case and the case at bar.
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The appellant also cites a late Utah case, Mingus v.
Olsson, 201 Pac. 2d. 495, which laid down the rule that
"The duty to look has inherent in it the duty to see what
is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." Respondent
has no quarrel with that rule. And under the facts in that
case it was properly applied.
A casual examination of the facts in that case will
distinguish it from the facts in the case at bar. For instance, in that case the plaintiffs~ intestate, a pedestrian,
accompanied by his wife, were walking easterly on the
south side of West Minister AvenlJe, and when they arrived at the intersection of said Avenue with 13th East
Street, the defendant was traveling south some distance
north of said intersection with his headlights burning.
The undisputed evidence in that case, in fact the intestate~s wife testified, that neither she nor her husband
looked north to ascertain if an automobile was approaching, therefore, in the Mingus case there was no dispute
about the decedent~s failure to look for cars approaching
from the north, and the evidence seems to show without
dispute that the decedent and his wife walked absentmindedly into the path of defendant's approaching car,
and it must also be remembered that in that case the
plaintiff's intestate and his wife were entering a through
street, while in the case at bar the plaintiff was traveling northerly on a through highway.
Appellant cites Hickok v. Skinner, (Utah) 190 P. 2d
514. In that case, the plaintiff was traveling north on
West Temple Street and stopped for stop sign at 21st
South, which street is an arterial highway. Plaintiff ad-
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mitted that he sa\v defendant coming westerly on 21st
South about 400 to 500 feet east from the intersection.
Plaintiff then proceeded to cross the intersection and was
struck by defendant's car in the north lane of traffic. The
plaintiff adn1itted that although he was aware of defendant's car coming westerly, he nevertheless drove through
the intersection without again looking to see where defendant was. That case is not in point \vith case at bar
for at least two good reasons: ( 1) Hickok, the plaintiff,
entered an arterial highway, 21st South Street, and his
right to do so was governe~y Section 57-7-138, U.C.A.
1943, which required him to yield the right of way to cars
approaching the intersection on arterial highways, under
certain conditions and ( 2) he failed to keep his eye on
Skinner, the defendant, although he was aware of Skinner's presence on the highway.
The evidence shows with very little, if any, dispute
that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate
cause of the accident. We have heretofore pointed out that
the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff was traveliing along the highway at a reasonable rate of speed, that
he had the right-of-way and was looking ahead and as
soon as the defendant started toward and upon the pavement, the pla~tiff was then so close to the defendant that
all plaintiff could do was apply the brakes and turn his
motorcycle to the left in an attempt to avoid the accident.
It thus definitely appears from the evidence that the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle in a careful and lawful
manner; and the accident would not have occurred if
the defendant, without looking and without warning, had
not driven his truck onto the pavement, and thus barri-
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caded the highway so closely in front of the plaintiff that
he was without any means of escape.
We respectfully submit that the defendant was grossly negligent and that his course of action in entering upon
the pavement as aforesaid, was the proximate cause of
this accident, as that rule is defined in a recent and well
considered case decided by this Court in Hess v. Robinson, 163 P. 2d. 510:
"To be a proximate cause of an injury it must
be an efficient act of causation and separated from
its effect by no other act of causation. There must
be a causal connection between the act or omission
and the subsequent injury. 'T~e law does not search
for the remote agencies by which an injury is brought
about or made possible, but holds the last conscious
agent in producing it responsible therefor.' Miner v.
McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138, 140, 21 L. R. A.
N. S., 477. It is one that directly causes or contributes directly to causing the result." (Italics added.)
II. Case properly submitted to Jury to determine questions of fact.
In the case at bar the plaintiff was traveling on the
arterial highway and the defendant was required to yield
right-of-way to plaintiff under Section 57-7-132 U.C.A.
1943, and as soon as plaintiff observed the defendant's truck entering upon the highway, he immediately took action to avoid the collision, but he was
"trapped" and, could not escape because of defendant's
unlawful entry upon the highway. It will thus be seen
that the factual situation, present in the case at bar, is entirely different from the factual situation present in the
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three Utah cases cited in appellant's brief, pages 9-11. The.
plaintiff's evidence clearly showed that he acted as a prudent n1otorist would act under the same circumstances,
and the evidence also shows that the defendant failed to
yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff and, therefon: it was
clearly a case for the jury to decide from all the facts and
circumstances in the case which party was at fault in
bringing about a collision in this case. The trial court was
well within its right in submitting this case to the jury.
Therefore, the court did not err in denying defendant's
motion for directed verdict.
Had appellant followed the course as indicated by
his exhibit No. 1, the accident would not have happened,
because plaintiff would have had sufficient room to pass
him, inasmuch as it appears from defendant's exhibit No.
1, that the left front wheel of the truck only entered about
half way over in the east lane of traffic. Thus leaving
the plaintiff with ample room to pass. Moreover, it is
admitted that the plaintiff's motorcycle collided with the
rear end of the left front fender, so that, if the defendant's
exhibit No. 1 is to be believed the plaintiff would have
actually had to make a sharp tum to his left and then
tum sharply back to his right in order to hit the truck on
the angle shown by the injury to the fender. And likewise, it is difficult to perceive how the defendant would
have landed over on the west shoulder of the highway had
the collision taken place as shown by defendant's exhibit

No. 1.
There is an attempt on the part of appellant by his
exhibit No. 1 to show that the accident did not happen
on the center line of the pavement as plaintiff testified,
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thus there is a conflict in the evidence which was resolved
by the jury. There are also other conflicts· in the testimony
which would necessarily have to be resolved by the jury,
and not by the Court.
This case comes squarely within the rule that where
the facts are conflicting and reasonable minds may differ
as to the facts and circumstances existing immediately
prior to the collision, the following rule as laid down by
this Court in the case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2d.
510, is controlling. The language used by this Court is
as follows:
"As to what the circumstances were at the time
plaintiff entered the intersection, and as to whether
entering under such circumstances was an act from
which a person of ordinary prudence and caution
would have foreseen that some injury would likely
result, are matters upon which reasonable minds may
differ. As such they are properly for the jury. Proximate cause and contributory negligence are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury to determine
under all the circumstances. ~~~~~·Questions of negligence do not become questions of law for the court
except where the facts are such that all reasonable
men draw the same conclusions."

CONCLUSION ·
The appellant's motion for a directed verdict was
properly denied by the trial court. This appeal involves
no question of law for the court, but only questions of fact
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for the jury and, the jury by their verdict under proper
instructions determined the issues in favor of plaintiff,
and)- there is sufficient competent testimony to support their verdict.

The trial court instructed the jury as requested by
appellant, and he had a fair trial. In fact, the trial court
was rather liberal with the appellant in over emphasizing
the question of contributory negligence by giving five
instructions all relating to this question. (Instructions
3 to 7 inclusive, Tr. 46-50. ) The appellant now wants to
try this case over again, but he has failed to show any
reason why he should be granted such a right.
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully
submits that the verdict in this case should be sustained
and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
GEORGE C. HEINRICH,
L. E. NELSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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